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Abstract
In this study, I examine how perceptions of NAFTA developed over 20 years since its
enactment, measured as perceived economic mobility in 2016, have affected more recent public
perceptions leading to increased, controversial tendencies towards nationalism, protectionism, and
pessimism about the future of the U.S. economy. I then assess whether and how such perceptions
in turn may have affected voter perceptions about Donald Trump, setting the stage for his 2016
election victory. Therein, I have found that among U.S. voters in 2016, those with perceptions of
reduced economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA were significantly more likely to have
supported changes in U.S. macroeconomic policies, to implement greater economic protection
from elitism within the U.S. government and foreign competition. Additionally, U.S. voters
holding said preferences were significantly more likely to support Trump’s candidacy during the
2016 Presidential election rather than Hillary Clinton. However, U.S. voters who identified as
victims of racial discrimination were significantly less likely to support Trump’s candidacy in
2016, even when holding preferences congruent with the Trump campaign policy agenda.
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1. Introduction

The 2016 U.S. election period was perhaps one of the most significant and controversial
elections in U.S. history. A variety of salient topics were debated, linking sociopolitical and
socioeconomic issues to foreign and domestic policy preferences. The marginalization of
individuals and groups amid a divide and conquer campaign strategy employed by Donald Trump
and other political entrepreneurs was a key focal point for constituents weighing their voting
options (Jensen & Bang, 2017:355). Race/ethnicity, income, access to education, healthcare,
firearms, immigration, and social status were but a few of the salient issues discussed by candidates
(Winder, 2016; Walley, 2017; Swedberg, 2018). Quite notably, another key issue which became
a critical policy debate for U.S. voters and political candidates across the ideological spectrum
(and perhaps particularly among blue collar, middle class workers) was the renegotiation of free
trade agreements (FTAs) with foreign countries, namely the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), along with other salient FTAs such as the Transpacific Partnership
(Brookshire, 2018:10-11,15; Walley 2017: 334). Many U.S. voters seemingly felt that their
economic mobility had been somehow negatively impacted overtime by the terms of NAFTA and
other agreements in observing, often firsthand, reductions in wages, employment opportunities,
and the influx of immigrants into the United States (Swedberg, 2018:16). Working-class voters in
the Midwest increasingly developed a resentment toward former President Barack Obama (as well
as his predecessors dating back to George H. W. Bush) because they felt forgotten often perceiving
that FTAs had fallen short in being negotiated or renegotiated for their personal interests, despite
previous assurances from President Obama on the campaign trail in 2008 (Walley, 2017:234).
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Meanwhile, a bloc of voters in the Southern U.S. felt that the influx of immigrants was degrading
the economy and/or even the U.S. identity1 (Walley, 2017:233).
One can then fast forward to the 2016 election cycle where issue linkages between growing
perceptions of reduced socioeconomic mobility, desires for immigration reform, and adjustments
to FTAs became resilient campaigning stump speech points, for Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump
(Walley, 2017: 234; Swedberg, 2018:16; Kluver, 2015:149). The platform of the victor and current
U.S. President Donald Trump was bolstered by incessant and insistent guarantees (often covered
live - far more than any other candidate - by the major news outlets) to renegotiate FTAs across
the board, tighten immigration policies, and improve the economic and social mobility of the
working-class (Swedberg, 2018:15, 18, 20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). By doing
so he presumably gained new levels of staunch support among voters who preferred a more
populist, nationalistic, protectionist macroeconomic policy agenda (Swedberg, 2018:15, 18, 20;
Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).
In the midst of the backdrop of Trump’s rhetorical overtures, some working-class voters
even began showing increased resentment toward Latino countries among which was Mexico,
claiming that the movement of multinational enterprises from the United States to Mexico to
employ cheaper labor was unfair and harmful to their economic mobility (Wally, 2017). Primarily
areas near the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexico borders contained importers and exporters who
have historically shared varying opinions toward NAFTA. Unlike the Transpacific Partnership,
NAFTA is a regional preferential free trade agreement allowing lower tariffs on goods traded

1

In some regions, most notably rural areas of within the Bible Belt, U.S. constituents believe that the election of
former U.S. President Barack Obama was a significant change in U.S. national identity. The former Presidents was
viewed as non-American due in part to misperceptions about his religious beliefs and citizenship (Walley,
2017:233).
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between Mexico, the U.S., and Canada (Hills, 2014). These opinions paired with xenophobic
rhetoric, issue linkages, and political framing exacerbated the idea that NAFTA was a key source
of economic disparity for working-class voters who desired greater market protection from foreign
competitors. NAFTA was enacted in 1994 during the Clinton Administration and was an update
to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement established in 1988 (Brookshire, 2018:8). The latest
version of the FTA over the trilateral bloc, negotiated under the Trump administration, is now
referred to as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (UMCA) (Hains, 2018). While
researchers will take time to determine the effectiveness of the renegotiated agreement (i.e.
UMCA), the long-term debate over the full effects of NAFTA on U.S. citizen economic mobility
continues (Hains, 2018).
Prior to the creation of the UMCA, NAFTA had existed for over two decades and during
this 20-year period opinions about its ongoing effects on the U.S. economy were mixed
(Brookshire, 2018; Pinto-Leon, 2011; Hills, 2014; Lederman & Serven, 2005; Thakkar & Sands,
2011). Although economic data related to NAFTA are robust, U.S. voters share differing opinions
about NAFTA based on their rules of reference, rules of meaning, and rules of value linked to
characteristics of their socioeconomic status (SES) and sociopolitical ideology.
Further research is necessary to determine the overall perceptions of U.S. voters about their
economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. This study seeks to investigate the perceptions
that U.S. voters have about their economic mobility over a 20-year period since the enactment of
NAFTA and add to the existing research aimed at understanding criticisms about its perceived
impact on the overall economic mobility of U.S. voters. I will next move on to my literature review,
which will begin with an overview of related national economic outcomes that have occurred since
the drafting and enactment of NAFTA. I will investigate opinions of favor or opposition toward
3

said outcomes and by extent NAFTA’s ratification. The linkages between political economic
outcomes and perceived economic mobility have greatly influenced voter perceptions of
transnational trust toward Mexico, and Latino immigrants. Perceptions of relative deprivation
have led to and exacerbated in-group and out-group competition, greater contrasts in racial
divisions, increased resentment toward regional integration, and ultimately heightened nationalism
to restrict Latino migrants and foreign imports (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2017:774). I believe
that perceptions of relative deprivation across blue collar U.S. voters are mostly, or at least in
notable part, due to issues politically linked to FTAs such as reductions in wages, employment
opportunities, and increases in foreign competition. These issues lie at the center of perceptions
about economic mobility during the 20-year period since NAFTA’s enactment, and have inflated
voter preferences toward protectionism.
Based on voters’ preferences for or against increased nationalism and protectionist trade
policies, I will also discuss growing discontent among voters who favor increased nationalism and
protectionist trade policies, and the increased likelihood for these voters to desire a change in the
macroeconomic practices of the national government. This change seems to have led to what is
commonly been referred to as, “the vote against the establishment” (Jensen & Bang, 2017:355).
These anti-establishment voters seem to have desired a change from the conventional handling of
the U.S. economy and had preferences aligned with more populist campaign platforms (Jensen &
Bang, 2017). I will discuss how these voters were more likely to be pessimistic about the future of
the economy based on their past experiences, SES, and location within the U.S. Finally, by
combining each of the key preference areas I will discuss the congruence between the Trump
campaign platform and voters who favored nationalist immigration policies, protectionist policies
restricting foreign trade, and populist-leaning political ideology. Perceptions of economic mobility
4

presumably became more negative over a 20-year period after the enactment of NAFTA,
particularly for voters who favored increased nationalism, protectionism, and populism (e.g., see
Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).
At the same time, since bigotry was a key rhetorical device used by President Donald
Trump, I also expect to find a lower likelihood of voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S.
Presidential election among voters who identify as having experienced racial discrimination, while
controlling for policy preferences congruent with those of the Trump campaign (i.e. greater
nationalism, protectionism, and populism) (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017;
Pinto-Leon, 2011). Many racial minorities are sensitive to bigotry based on their experience with
past mistreatment which is well documented in U.S. history. Although most U.S. voters may
perceive economic mobility as reduced and harder over the past 20 years since NAFTA’s
enactment, racial minorities in the U.S. are less likely than the U.S. racial majority to perceive a
reduction in overall economic mobility. Therein, I expect in line with previous research that
emotions such as empathy for others being mistreated (rhetorically and/or policy-wise) even in the
face of real (or at least perceived) economic competition with those being mistreated, here namely
Hispanic and Latino/a immigrants, can affect voter’s political preferences differently based on
their sensitivity to racial discrimination (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).

5

2. Literature Review
The literature review is divided into five sections which cover the theoretical arguments I
will use to substantiate my contentions related to the political, social, and economic dynamics
mentioned above. “Section a” discusses the concept of economic mobility in terms of what it is
and how it is measured based on U.S. perceptions. “Section b” provides information on the policy
scope and coverage of NAFTA, as well as economic data related to each member of the trilateral
bloc. “Section c” discusses U.S. perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA
with an analysis of U.S. attitudes toward NAFTA, and political responses to NAFTA based on its
perceived impacts among U.S. constituents. “Section d” is an analysis of the 2016 Trump
campaign which discusses key policy positions and agendas through political rhetoric during the
campaign related to nationalism, protectionism, and populism, each of which were reportedly
preferential to a significant number of U.S. constituents, but simultaneously and vociferously
rejected by those sensitive to the candidate’s bigotry. In the literature review’s final section, I
present my seven hypotheses and provide a theoretical framework for each.
2.1 Economic Mobility
Although there is no singularly adopted measure of economic mobility, the description I
use is based on perceptions among U.S. constituents about whether their overall chances to
improve their socioeconomic position (e.g. achieve or improve their financial well-being or ability
to access opportunities to get ahead) has increased or decreased over a given period of time (see
Figures 1 through 4) (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951). Evidence
shows that U.S. citizens generally tend to underestimate economic inequality and overestimate
upward economic mobility (Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300). Inversely, as perceived income
6

inequality increases perceived mobility should decrease (Bertotti & Modanese, 2016). Either way,
perceptions of economic mobility should be negatively correlated with economic inequality.
However, individual characteristics of socioeconomic status (SES) shape perceptions about
inequality differently and play a key role in how U.S. citizens determine the causes of disparities
between income and economic status. Differences in gender, race/ethnicity, education, occupation,
location, and familial endowments affect individual-level economic trajectories differently.
Given that my analysis is based on U.S. perceptions of NAFTA over a 20-year period, the
effects of intragenerational mobility, which is a measure of changes in economic status during a
person’s life, are of increased interest because they relate to perceptions of U.S. constituents who
may have experienced changes in economic status throughout different periods of earnings
(Athreya & Romero, 2015:174). Intergenerational mobility is of importance because it provides a
comparison of a constituent’s economic status to that of their parents. Perceptions of
intragenerational economic mobility depend on perceptions of intergenerational mobility and vice
versa. Choices made by a constituent over the duration of their lifetime impact economic
outcomes, especially those related to risk-averse and risk-acceptant behaviors (Athreya & Romero,
2015:186). A constituent’s perceptions of overall change in economic status begins with a measure
of perceived change since their youth. Therefore, a measure of perceived change in economic
mobility over a 20-year period combined with measures of perceived income inequality and social
mobility should suffice in capturing changes in either type of mobility discussed here (i.e.
intergeneration, intragenerational, social, and economic) for constituents varying in
socioeconomic status and ascribed as well as achieved characteristics. The past 20-year period is
significant due to increases in U.S. involvement with free trade agreements, especially NAFTA
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(Pinot-Leon, 2011; Brookshire, 2018; Thakkar & Sands, 2011; Lederman & Serven, 2005; Hills,
2014).
2.2 NAFTA
The North American Free Trade Agreement is a regional preferential free trade agreement
which was enacted in 1994 during the Clinton administration (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). The
agreement was established between Canada, Mexico, and the United States acting as an extension
of the 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) and eventually superseding
it (Brookshire, 2018:8). A rich history of trade had already existed between the U.S. and Canada
through the Elgin-Marcy Treaty (Canadian-American Reciprocity Agreement) which contributed
to setting the foundation for the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and the Auto-Pact of
1965 (Brookshire, 2018:8). Although cross-border travel has tripled since NAFTA’s enactment –
and it should be noted more broadly that cross-border travel between Mexico and the U.S. has
overall generally decreased to present – it does not establish political and economic integration
like within the European Union (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). NAFTA does not allow the free movement
of migrants and each member-state continues to use its own currency. However, NAFTA does
cover key areas aimed at reducing economic inequality amongst its three members, especially
Mexico, such as reductions in tariffs, rules of origin, financial services, intellectual property rights,
a means of reviewing and settling trade-related disputes, investment resolutions for claims made
against state-actors, protections for Mexico’s petroleum-related industries, and sanitary measures
and policies for agricultural goods (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27).
The inclusion of Mexico was intended to enhance the country’s economy by decreasing
unemployment while increasing Mexico’s overall convergence with the U.S. and Canada
8

(Lederman & Serven, 2005:337). A reduction in wage disparities between the U.S. and Mexico
was also an expectation of the agreement which would curtail migration north into the U.S. from
Mexico. Although Mexican wages in areas along the U.S.-Mexico border have grown faster
compared to southern Mexico (e.g. as relating to maquiladoras), there is little evidence of
convergence in wages between U.S. and Mexican unskilled laborers, with most of the convergence
occurring between high-skilled workers within the U.S. and Mexico (Lederman & Serven,
2005:339-341; Brookshire, 2018:9). However, the wages earned have been disproportionate
between U.S. Hispanic and non-U.S. Hispanic blue-collar workers with those from the U.S.
earning more (see Figure 5) (Mora & Davila, 2011: 851-853). Since the enactment of NAFTA, a
regional market estimated between $17 and $20.6 trillion in value has been created with between
440 and 489 million consumers located across each of the three countries (Hills, 2014:122; PintoLeon, 2011:27). In 2015, the combined gross national income had increased to $20.6 trillion and
consumer base of 489 million consumers (Brookshire, 2018:10). However, U.S. and Mexican bluecollar wages have generally remained stagnant compared to CEO earnings, which have increased
substantially since the early 2000’s (see Figure 5) (LCLAA, 2018).
Among the three countries, the United States seems to have benefited the most from the
trilateral bloc (Brookshire, 2018:10; Thakkar and Sands, 2011: 153). The U.S. had increased
international trade by nearly 128% between the years 1994 and 2000. Its exports to Mexico and
Canada were increased by 24% during the same period (Brookshire, 2018:10). The geographic
proximity of the U.S. with Canada and Mexico has allowed for it to reduce the transaction costs
of exports into the countries making them top consumers of U.S. exports (Brookshire, 2018:10).
Revenue generated by U.S. goods and services were estimated at $1.1 trillion, with $482 billion
of it generated from exports and $596 billion generated from imports (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). Also,
9

in 2008, U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mexico and Canada combined was $322.9 billion
compared to a combined estimate in FDI of $229.8 billion from Canada and Mexico (see Figure
6a and 6b) (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27). NAFTA has allowed almost no restrictions on agricultural
goods from the U.S. into Mexico. U.S. investment into Mexico is primarily allocated to
manufacturing and automotive industries (Hills, 2014:123). Although economic data and the
perceived gains of NAFTA for the trilateral bloc are robust and attribute the greatest beneficiary
as the U.S., the perceptions of some U.S. constituents run contrary to this (Pinto-Leon, 2011:27).
Income inequality has increased over time while U.S. and Mexico blue-collar wages have
remained mostly stagnant (LCLAA, 2018:10). The misperceptions of Americans in responding to
this FTA merits further research and this study intends to help fill that gap, both theoretically and
analytically. The next section begins to address this trend in negative perceptions toward NAFTA.
2.3 Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since the Enactment of NAFTA
Perceptions of NAFTA very among constituents within the participating countries. For this
study I am interested in the perceptions of U.S. constituents about NAFTA. Due to lower wages
in Mexico, related to the divergences in income and exchange rates, multinational corporations
have displayed a tendency to move some unskilled and low-skilled manufacturing jobs to Mexico
since NAFTA’s enactment (Pinto-Leon, 2011:28; Mora & Davila, 2011). The off-shoring of U.S.
jobs is a key issue that receives increased attention among U.S. constituents (see Figure 7). The
U.S. has experienced an estimated loss of roughly 45,000 jobs per year to Mexico which was
related to NAFTA, but the transference of jobs from the U.S. to Mexico have been a net benefit to
the U.S. economy (Brookshire, 2018:11). Brookshire contends that for every 100 jobs lost to
Mexico, 250 jobs in skilled labor are created in the U.S. (Brookshire, 2018:12). However, attention
to data displaying the net benefit is usually overshadowed by an increased inclination among U.S.
10

constituents to disfavor FTAs and instead focus on political and ideological factors (Brookshire,
2018:11). For example, evidence related to the textile industry in 2007 showed that regional FTAs
were not the direct cause of unemployment in areas like the northeastern U.S. and that trends in
job loss and decreased wages were occurring prior to U.S. involvement in NAFTA (Thakkar &
Sands, 2011:150). Between 1992 and 2008, job losses in the region were more closely related to
the movement of unskilled labor to developing countries with lower wages, excluding Mexico
(Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150).
This analysis suggests that perceptions of U.S. constituents about the economic effects of
NAFTA since its enactment are inaccurate. During election periods disproportionate portrayals of
current events are used to frame political, social, and economic information to provide cues to the
constituent audience (Jensen & Bang, 2017:348; Hicks, Milner, & Tingley, 2014:109). Economic
data gathered by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
indicates that the highest rates of unemployment in the U.S. manufacturing sectors between years
1985 and 2007 occurred between 1985 and 1986. This predates the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement which was enacted in 1989; other periods of increased unemployment inconsistent with
FTA enactments are 1991 to 1993, and 2008 to 2009 (see Figure 8) (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151152; Brookshire, 2018:8). Perceptions that job losses in U.S. manufacturing were directly related
to NAFTA or its predecessor CUSFTA may be ill-founded. The BEA data suggests a decreased
likelihood of job loss in the U.S. manufacturing sector to Mexico due to regional FTAs, based on
the dates in which there was a significant increase in unemployment and the times of enactments
(Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151).
However, some U.S. constituents believe that Mexico is unfairly gaining an economic
advantage through NAFTA at the expense of the U.S. As shown in Figure 9, although Mexico’s
11

overall position within the global economy has improved, its national economic growth has not
been nearly as robust when compared to the U.S. since NAFTA’s enactment (Brookshire, 2018:10;
Thakkar & Sands; 2011:153). Mexico is no longer as reliant on its petroleum sector and since
NAFTA’s enactment, has been able to benefit from the stability of an improved export-oriented
manufacturing sector (e.g. maquiladoras) (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:151). Movement from rural
areas to urban areas of Mexican citizens to occupy positions of employment in the maquiladoras,
has also resulted in a decrease of agricultural laborers which has increased the demand for U.S.
produce Mexico (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150; Lederman & Serven, 2005:339). Due in part to
these developments, during recessionary periods Mexico can fall back on its petroleum
endowments to mitigate the effects of exogenous economic shocks and increase its purchasing
power parity (PPP) as it did from the year 2000 to 2009 (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:153). I contend
that this is a benefit to the U.S. agricultural sector, yet a tremendous loss that sent shocks through
rural Mexico.
The percentage of the Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) attributed to agriculture
decreased from an estimated 5.6% in 1993 to 3.8% in 2003 (Thakkar & Sands, 2011:150).
Mexico’s agricultural and rural townships were devastated by the influx of subsidized agricultural
goods received from the U.S. and many have lost their livelihoods (see Figure 10) (LCLAA, 2018;
Lederman & Serven, 2005). Minimum wage is 14% less now than it was prior to NAFTA’s
enactment with factory wages 40% lower than those in China (LCLAA, 2018). There is a positive
association between influx in U.S. agricultural goods to the Mexico and increases in annual illegal
immigration into the U.S. from Mexico (LCLAA, 2018).
Although Mexico has notably improved, this does not suggest that distributional effects
within the country are not skewed (Lederman & Serven, 2005: 338-340). What it does show is that
12

a key goal associated with the purpose of NAFTA’s enactment was somewhat fulfilled at the
expense of the livelihood of many Mexico citizens, and that Mexico’s gains were by no means as
robust as gains made by the U.S. according to economic data (Lederman & Serven, 2005: 338340; Thakkar & Sands, 2011: 152). Overall, perceptions of economic mobility as having been
negatively affected by NAFTA because of Mexico have an increased tendency to be founded on
misunderstandings and sociopolitical preferences driven by misinformation and disinformation.
Job losses due to NAFTA have occurred on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border (LCLAA, 2018).
The political implications of the U.S. constituents preferring to adopt policy positions based on
these misunderstandings provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs seeking to draw political
support, with an executable platform from which to gain it. One such unabashed political
entrepreneur was Donald J. Trump.
2.4 The Trump Campaign
On June 16, 2015 Donald J. Trump formally embarked on a campaign largely based on
economic nationalism using anti-globalist rhetoric, assurances of protectionism through trade
strategies aimed at renegotiating FTAs to benefit U.S. constituents, taking policy positions
promising greater restrictions on immigration into the U.S., and supporting populist policy
positions ensuring his constituents that he would take care of blue collar workers (Swedberg,
2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231). He topped of the official launch of his
campaign with rhetorical vitriol aimed directly at Mexico (including its trade relationship with the
U.S.) and Mexicans immigrating to the U.S.: “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime.
They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (Reilly, 2016). According to survey
conducted by PEW Research Center, among registered voters who identified as Trump supporters,
66% believed that immigration was a problem of increased severity; ANES 2016 data are
13

congruent with this (see Figure 12 through 14) (Doherty, 2016). However, immigration from
Mexico to the U.S. has actually been decreasing with more Mexicans leaving than arriving
between 2009 and 2014 (Winders, 2016:291). Throughout the campaign, Trump’s base displayed
high, sustained, and seemingly increasing propensity to favor his approach based in part on these
positions and political rhetoric. Some constituents with negative opinions toward FTAs based their
opinions of the perceived effects that economic competition with foreign markets had on their
economic mobility, and thus favored increased economic nationalism (see Figure 11 a and b)
(Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). Economic nationalism is described as a readiness to
support nationalist economic policy as, as such, presumably serves as a function of the perceived
economic threat posed by foreign competition (Swedberg, 2018:15).
In 2016, according to surveys administered by Bloomberg and Gallop, between 34% and
68% of the U.S. population supported economic protectionism; the differences between the two
statistics is believed to be due to the wording of the questions pertaining to protectionism. In the
Bloomberg survey, protectionism was linked to the idea of protecting U.S. jobs (Swedberg,
2018:19). Various definitions were thrown around across media outlets leaving U.S. voters to
determine for themselves how to politically conceptualize their positions which were sometimes
confusing (Walley, 2017: 234-235). The Trump campaign played on the notion of protecting jobs
by blaming immigrants and foreign competitors for U.S. job losses (Walley, 2017:231; Winders,
2016). The Trump campaign then went on to make political promises to supporters, ensuring that
it would bring back jobs and renegotiate trade deals (Walley, 2017: 232). Blue collar workers who
identified as working-class made up a significant portion of Trump constituents following
Clinton’s apparent lack of attention toward renegotiating free trade agreements in the initial
Presidential debates (Walley, 2017: 232).
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Populism has increased in the last decade due in part to increases in resentment, movement
away partisan politics, and declining trust in politicians and political institutions (Jensen & Bang,
2017: 344). The Trump campaign tailored its position in disfavor of the economic establishment
and championed a change in economic policies different from conventional practices (Jensen &
Bang, 2017: 344). The definition of populism I will apply here is ideologically centrist viewing
society as separated into primarily two parts, the first being the pure people and the second being
the corrupt elite; the perspective contends that political action should be the general will of the
people (see Figure 13) (adopted from Jensen & Bang, 2017: 346). Economic nationalism,
protectionism, and populism were key aspects of the Trump campaign, but another key aspect was
Donald Trump’s use of racial bigotry. During the 2016 election Trump’s bigotry toward Mexicans
was aimed at divisively inflating negative perceptions of Hispanic and Latino immigrants overall,
and had become a key speaking point of Trump’s campaign rhetoric (Winders, 2016: 291).
As previously mentioned, Trump accused Mexico of “sending” its worst nationals such
rapists, drug-runners, and criminals across the U.S. southern border, rarely citing that among the
immigrants were those seeking work or asylum (Winders, 2016:291). Although there was an
increased propensity for the average U.S. voter to favor candidates with populist, protectionist,
and economic nationalist policy positions, the use of racial bigotry was simultaneously a definite
“turn-off” for some U.S. constituents. For these latter individuals, there is presumably a powerful
level of sensitivity, and even empathy (see Sirin et al. 2016), toward those attacked due to having
experienced racial discrimination during their own lives, perhaps even overpowering the strength
of opinions about economic mobility and factors contributing to perceptions of its reduction.
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3. Theoretical Framework
This study seeks to investigate the perceptions that U.S. voters have about their economic
mobility over a 20-year period since the enactment of NAFTA and add to the existing research
aimed at understanding criticisms about its perceived impact versus actual impact on the overall
economic mobility of U.S. voters. Specifically, the overriding research question is as follows: how
did U.S. perceptions of economic mobility affect voter perceptions of the U.S. economy overall,
and what are the implications therein related to individual and group preferences toward NAFTA
and Trump’s candidacy, during the 2016 U.S. elections?
My first hypothesis will investigate the relationship between U.S. perceptions of NAFTA
over the past 20 years as a measure of perceived economic mobility and the three policy positions
of the Trump campaign (i.e. protectionism, economic nationalism, and populism). Below I outline
my first hypothesis (and additional hypotheses thereafter) and provide footnotes with the details
of the survey questions employed to operationalize each of the major factors conditioning
perception dynamics for the analyses I plan to conduct.


H1. I suspect that as a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility2 as reduced
(harder) in 2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA

2

The question within the 2016 ANES survey referring to economic mobility is drawn from section 127.6, item 2, and
reads, “When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is now easier, harder, or
the same as it was 20 years ago?”. Response are “1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. Same” (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169;
Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951). Section 127.6, item 3, reads, “How much easier or harder compared to 20 years
ago?”. Responses are, “1. A great deal easier 2. A moderate amount easier 3. A little easier 4. A little harder 5. A
moderate amount 6. A great deal harder”. Also, section 127.6, item 1, and reads, “How much opportunity is there in
America today for the average person to get ahead?” Responses are “1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount,
4. A little, 5. None”. Section 33.7, item 1, reads, “Do you think the difference in incomes between rich and poor people
in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago?” Responses are, “1. Larger 2.
Smaller 3. About the same” (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951).
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increases, they are more likely to prefer greater nationalism 3, protectionism4, and are
more likely to hold populist beliefs such as resentment toward elitism 5 (see Figure 15a.)
(Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).
-

H1a. As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder)
since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases, they
are more likely to prefer greater economic nationalism.

-

H1b. As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder) in
2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases,
they are more likely to prefer greater protectionism4. I have two ways to measure
preferences for greater protectionism in this study supported by their conjunction
with the literature review and available survey data, so I will test them separately
as H1b1. and H1b2 (Swedberg, 2018:19).

-

H1c. As a voter’s inclination to perceive economic mobility as reduced (harder) in
2016 since the past 20-year period following the enactment of NAFTA increases,
they are more likely to hold populist belief.

3

The statement within the 2016 ANES survey referring to nationalism is from section 127.2, item 1, and reads, “The
world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans.” Responses are “1. Agree
strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Neither agree nor disagree, 4. Disagree somewhat, 5. Disagree strongly” (Swedberg,
2018:15).
4
The questions within the 2016 ANES survey referring to protectionism against FTAs and job competition are from
section 136.8, item 2, and reads, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. making free trade
agreements with other countries?” Responses to this question are “1. Favor, 2. Oppose, 3. Neither favor nor oppose.”
(Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). Section 134, item 2, reads, “How likely is it that recent immigration
levels will take jobs away from people already here (i.e. U.S.)?” Responses are “1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely,
3. Somewhat likely, 4. Not at all likely.”
5
The questions within the 2016 ANES survey referring to an operationalization of populism is from section 48.6, item
4, and reads, “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or
that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” Responses are “1. Run by a few big interests or 2. For the benefit of all
the people.”
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My second hypothesis test the relationship between economic mobility, economic
nationalism, protectionism, and populism with the likelihood of voting for Donald Trump 6.


H2. Given these characteristics, I predict that voter inclinations greatly depend on their
SES and sociopolitical ideologies, in that as preferences for greater nationalism,
protectionism, and populism increase, their likelihood of intending to vote for U.S.
President Donald Trump during the 2016 U.S. elections also increased (see Figure 15b.)
(Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).

My third hypothesis test the relationship between the intent to vote for Donald Trump and
perceptions of economic mobility.


H3. If a voter is intent on voting for Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. Presidential
election then they are more likely to perceive that their economic mobility is reduced
(become harder) in 2016 compared to the past 20 years (see Figure 15c.) (Walley,
2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16).

My final hypothesis tests the effects of identifying as a victim of racial discrimination on
the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump, and therein implicitly overpowering
perceptions of economic mobility and opinions toward economic nationalism, protectionism, and
populism like those which would align the constituent with the Trump campaign. It can be argued
that perceptions of fairness and equal opportunity are divided between U.S. constituents based on
race, and that non-white constituents show an increased level of empathy toward immigrants and
subaltern members of the U.S. population (Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).

6

The question within the 2016 ANES survey referring to a vote for Trump is from section 21.1, item 16.5, and reads,
“Who do you think you will vote for?” Responses are “1. Hillary Clinton, 2. Donald Trump, 3. Gary Johnson, 4. Jill
Stein, 5. Other (Specify).”

18

When perceiving mistreatment or inappropriate social exchanges, non-whites show an increased
propensity to respond in support of victims, especially those outside of their ethnic/ racial group
(Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). This suggests that non-Anglos are more
likely than Anglos to display empathy across group boundaries equivalent to members from the
ethnic/ racial category of the victim. This was more apparent in African Americans and Latinos
(Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). Therefore, the propensity to show increased
sensitivity toward racial discrimination is likely to be higher among non-Anglo U.S. constituents.
Additionally, I control for self-identified race and isolate the explanatory power of racial
discrimination regardless of self-identified race, so that my results can apply to U.S. constituents
regardless of race.


*H4. I contend that as the level of experienced racial discrimination increases among
U.S. constituents7, their likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump decreases,
especially when additionally controlling for perceptions of economic mobility and
preferences congruent to the Trump campaign platform (see Figure 15d) (Winders,
2016:291; Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017).

The theoretical framework is somewhat transitive in that if H1 holds true, then so should
H2 and H3. However, if transitivity exists between H1, H2, and H3 then there should be increased
likelihood that H4 is true as well in that sensitivity to discrimination should override the economic
opinions of U.S. constituents based on how representative the survey sample is of the U.S.
electorate (see Figure 15e & Figure 4). Regardless of socioeconomic status and sociopolitical

7

The question within the 2016 ANES survey referring to importance of U.S. constituent’s racial identity are from
section 165, item 2, and reads, “How much discrimination have you personally faced because of your skin color (e.g.
light, medium, or dark)?” Responses for each item are “1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5.
Not at all.”
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preferences H4 provides a strikingly significant counterargument to the transitivity and combined
explanatory power of H1, H2, and H3.
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4. Data & Methods
4.1 Data
Data used will originate from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) crosssection survey. Appendix A provides an overview of distributions within the 2016 ANES sample
across a variety of socioeconomic and sociopolitical characteristics as well as general distributions
related to U.S. Hispanics and Latinos. These distributions are important whereas they substantiate
the validity of using this dataset as the main source of statistical data by providing general estimates
and descriptors of U.S. constituents, and the country’s electorate (see Appendix A).
4.1a Sample Distributions (see Appendix A)
I chose this dataset because the sample’s demographic and socioeconomic distributions
were relatively like some of the distributions reported by the U.S. Census Bureau within the
V20188 U.S. population estimates (see Appendix B). The 2016 American National Election
Studies (ANES) cross-section survey has a sample size of 4,271 survey respondents (N=4,271) of
which 54% identify as women.9 The primary racial categories10 used in the survey are white (72%),
Hispanic (11%), black (9%), Asian/Hawaiian/Pacific (3%), New World Indigenous (1%), and
multi-ethnic (4%). I grouped reported income11 levels into quantiles; the first quantile uses a range
from 0 to 22.49 thousand USD (15%), the second ranges from 22.5 to 49.9 thousand USD (25%),

8

“V2018” is a vintage year and is the final year of a particular series of sampling years (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018).
Section 63.1, Item 1.5, asks respondents, “What is your gender?” Responses are “1. Male 2. Female 3. Other.”
10
Section 62, Item 52.5, reads, “Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be.” Response are “1.
White, 2. Black or African-American, 3. American Indian or Alaskan Native, 4. Asian, 5. Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Islander.” The Hispanic category is present within the summary of self-identified race, and the distribution
represents Hispanic as its own category.
11
Section 63.3, Item 1, reads, “What was the total income in 2015 of all your family members living here / your total
income in 2015? Respondents were direct to type the figure between 0-99,999,999.
9
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the third ranges from 50 to 89.9 thousand USD (29%), and the fourth ranges from 90 to 250 or
more thousand USD (31%). The highest levels of education 12 reported in ANES 2016, and used
for my analysis, consisted of constituents who indicated having either a 12 th grade education with
no diploma or less (7%), either a high school diploma/GED or some college with no degree (40%),
an associate degree (i.e. occupational or academic degree) (14%), a bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA,
BS, etc.) (23%), or a graduate degree (e.g. MA, MS, Ph.D., J.D., etc.) (16%). Of those respondents
who perceive that they belong to a social class 13 11% identified as lower class, 33% identified as
middle class, 52% identified as working class, and 5% identify as upper class. 61% of the sample
identified as being employed during the survey. The size of respondent households varies from 1
to 12 additional occupants.14 30% of survey respondents identifying as renters, 41% as
homeowners paying a mortgage, 21% owning their home with no payments due, and 7% who
identified as having other arrangements.15 When asked about having any form of health insurance,
91% identified as being insured16 and 10% of the survey respondents are naturalized citizens17. Of
respondents who identified their political party orientation 18, 36% claimed orientation toward the
Democratic party, 30% claimed orientation toward the Republican party, 34% identified as

12

Section 62, Item 7.1, reads, “What is highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?”
13
Section 62, Item 49.3, reads “How would you describe your social class? Are you in the lower class, the working
class, the middle class, or the upper class?” Responses are “1. Lower class 2. Working class 3. Middle class 4.
Upper Class.”
14
Section 30, Item 1, reads “How many family members are living with you?” Responses to this question were
numeric entries that could range from 0 to 20.
15
Section 62.7, Item 6.5, reads “Do you pay rent home, make monthly mortgage payments for your home, own your
home outright with no payments due, or have some other living arrangement?” Response are “1. Pay rent 2. Pay
mortgage 3. Own home with no payments due, 4. Some other arrangement.”
16
Section 31.2, Item .5 reads “Do you presently have any kind of health insurance? Responses are “1. Yes, 2. No.”
17
Section 62, Item 58, reads “In what state, country, or territory were you born?” Responses are 1. A U.S. state or
D.C. , 2. Puerto Rico, 3. Another U.S. territory (Guam, Amer. Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands), 4. Another Country.”
18
Section 39, Item 1, reads “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican / a
Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?” Responses are “0. No preference, 1. Democrat/ Republican, 2.
Republican/ Democrat, 3. Independent, 5. Other party.”
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independent. Distributions by age show that 25% of survey respondents are between 18 and 34
years of age, another 25% are between 35 and 50 years of age, 36% are between 51 and 69 years
of age, and 14% are between 70 and 90 years of age or older.
The second largest primary racial category used in the survey is Hispanic (see Appendix
C). Keeping in mind that Hispanics were a primary target of disinformation during the U.S. 2016
election cycle, and that 57% speak Spanish more often to none or very little 19, I also include
distributions of preferences for Spanish and English language use among Hispanics (Reilly,
2016;Winders, 2016: 291). 47% of Hispanics within the sample speak either mostly or only
English within their household, while 20% speak either mostly or only Spanish at home, and 33%
speak both languages equally. 80% of Hispanics within the sample view news in English more
often than Spanish and only 4% view news in both languages equally. Based on the distributions
I conclude that respondents of the Hispanic category are mostly bilingual, prefer to speak English,
and use news outlets broadcasted in English more often than Spanish. I think due to the subsample
size of respondents identifying as Hispanic the concepts and relationships being tested are in part
representative of participating Hispanic voters. 64% of Hispanics within the subsample believe
that either some, or a major portion of their lives, is affected by what generally happens to Hispanic
people in the U.S.20 I think the bigotry used during the 2016 Presidential election affected the
political opinions of some Hispanics, and that the Hispanic subsample of the 2016 ANES cross-

19

Section 151.6, Item 1.8, reads “Comparing how often you speak in English or Spanish in your day-today life,
would you stay you are generally speaking…?” Responses are “1. English and little or no Spanish, 2. Mostly
English but Spanish at least some of the time 3. Both English and Spanish about equally, 4. Mostly Spanish but
English at least some of the time, 5. Spanish and little or no English.”
20
Section 151.7, Item 11, reads “How much do you think that what happens generally to Hispanics people in this
country will affect what happens in your life…?” Response are 1. A lot, 2. Some, 3. Not very much, 4. Not at all.”
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sectional survey provides enough observations to test for this. I will now discuss the data I used to
measure concepts within each of my hypotheses.
4.2 Hypothesis 1
To test my first hypothesis, I use three separate dependent variables and hypotheses to test
the marginal effects that perceptions of economic mobility2 have on the likelihood of desiring
greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs. Since there is more than one
definition and measure of economic mobility, I use three related concepts presented in the literature
and theoretically associated with economic mobility (i.e. social mobility, financial economic
mobility, and opinions of income inequality) to more fully test for significant marginal effects. I
will discuss each of the data used for this multivariate multiple regression analysis.
4.2a Hypothesis 1a. Dependent Variable: Increased Nationalism (Binary) (see Appendix D)
The dependent variable for hypothesis 1a. is increased nationalism.3 I measure it using
survey responses that indicate a constituent prefers the expansion of the U.S. national identity
within the global footprint. Of the original 3,644 respondents who responded to the respective
survey question of whether they disagree or agree with the statement, the world would be a better
place if people from other countries were more like Americans, 85% of the total sample selected
one of the values from 1. through 5., 35% of the 85% (N=3,644) who selected one of the values
1. through 5. selected value 3.- neither agree nor disagree. 30% of the 3,644 respondents showed
agreement with the statement either somewhat or strongly, and 35% disagree either somewhat or
strongly. In hypothesis 1a. I am testing to detect the likelihood of a preference for an expansion of
the U.S. national identity within the global footprint being affected by the perception dynamics
theoretically linked to perceptions of reduced (harder) economic mobility.
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I believe that the survey question captures a preference for greater nationalism by asking
constituents if they agree that the spread or increase of U.S. ideology in other countries would
improve the world, thereby showing a preference for an expansion of U.S. national identity. I
recoded the response data to generate a binary variable for nationalism, where agreeing in either
capacity (i.e. somewhat or strongly) is represented by the value 1 and disagreeing in either capacity
(i.e. somewhat or strongly) is represented by the value 0 (see Appendix E). I also removed
observations for the 35% of constituents who selected that they neither agree or disagree, making
the contrast between agreement and disagreement greater, and reducing the number of
observations used for this variable (N=2,372); of the two outcomes used 47% agree and 53%
disagree, and the distributions are almost equal. By specifically measuring the outcome of
agreement or disagreement with this variable, I can statistically test the likelihood of preferences
for an increase in the prevalence of the U.S. national identity.
4.2b1 Hypothesis 1b1. Dependent Variable: Opposes Involvement in FTA's (see Appendix D)
The dependent variable for hypothesis 1b. is opposes involvement in FTA's which is used
as an operationalization protectionism4. I measure it using survey responses which indicate that a
voter prefers greater economic protection nationally from foreign competition, based on their
attitude toward free trade agreements between the U.S. and foreign countries. Responses
(N=2,147) to the survey question4 that were values 1. and 2. were used as a means of contrastingly
measuring the attitude of respondents who favor or oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements
with other countries. 34% of respondents oppose the U.S. making free trade agreements with other
countries however, the remaining 66% favor the U.S. making free trade agreements with other
countries. In hypothesis 1b. I test here to determine if the likelihood of preferring greater
protectionism increases if voters oppose U.S. involvement in FTA's. I believe that the survey
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question provides a means of measuring preferences for increased protectionism because it directly
focuses on FTA’s and is therefore a measure including some attitudes toward NAFTA. The
marginal effects of perception dynamics theoretically associated with economic mobility will be
tested against a binary operationalization for protectionism recoded from the response data. The
variable - opposes involvement in FTA's - is a binary measure of favoring or opposing FTA’s; I set
the oppose value as 1 and favor value as 0 (see Appendix E). The distributions remained the same.
I think the protectionism variable properly measures opposition toward foreign economic
competition, and that I can statistically test characteristics of the relationship between
protectionism during the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, and perception dynamics associated with
economic mobility.
4.2b2. Hypothesis 1b2. Dependent Variable: Job Loss Due to Immigration (see Appendix D)
Concerns about job losses due to foreign competition were accompanied with opinions that
job losses are also related to immigration levels4. I use this question’s response data (N=3,630) to
generate an interval variable as a measure of opinions among voters about foreign influences on
the U.S. domestic labor market. When asked how likely recent immigration levels will take jobs
away from people already here, 15% believed it to be extremely likely, 20% believed it to be very
likely, 41% believed it to be somewhat likely, and 24% believed that it is not likely at all. I will
test the marginal effects of perceptions of economic mobility as reduced (harder) on this variable
which measures the prevalence and intensity of the belief that U.S. immigration levels will result
in job loss. I recoded responses for this variable so that values increase with the perceived
likelihood of domestic job loss due to U.S. immigration levels (see Appendix E).
4.2c Hypothesis 1c. Dependent Variable: Holds Populist Belief (see Appendix D)
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The dependent variable of hypothesis 1c., holds populist belief, is a measure of populism
among voters based on their opinions about the interests of the U.S. government. 5 I measure it
using survey responses (N=4,214) that indicate either a belief that the government is run by a few
big interests or for the benefit of all the people. 17% of voters believe that the government is run
for the benefit of all the people and 83% of voters believe that it is run by a few big interests. In
hypothesis 1c. I will test the likelihood of holding populist beliefs based on perceptions of
economic mobility being reduced and harder in 2016 compared to 20 years prior during the period
immediately following NAFTA’s enactment (i.e. circa 1996). I contend that the survey question
provides a clear reference to the anti-elitist populism discussed within the literature review (Jensen
& Bang, 2017: 346). I recoded the response data to generate a binary variable for populism where
beliefs that the government is run by a few big interests are coded as 1 and beliefs that the
government is run for the benefit of all the people are coded as 0 (see Appendix E). This variable
allows for me to test the marginal effects of perceptions toward economic mobility on the
likelihood of holding populist beliefs.
4.2d Hypothesis One Independent Variables: Finances, Opportunities, and Income Inequality (see
Appendix D)
I use four variables to collectively represent the perception dynamics theoretically linked
to economic mobility. I measure the independent variable in part as a measure of voters’ perception
of their economic mobility as harder in 2016 compared since NAFTA’s enactment 2 using binary
and interval measures. Although the economic mobility variable captured in ANES 2016 survey
is an evaluation of one’s ability to improve their financial well-being, the timespan corroborates
with using the survey questions that measure perceptions about characteristics of economic
mobility over a 20-year period. The period is during the earliest years of NAFTA, whose enactment
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was 2 years prior to the measured timespan. Therefore, I use responses to these survey questions
(section 127.6, item 2 and 3)2 as a measure of perceptions of economic mobility in terms of income
(i.e. easier, harder, or the same) made based on the opinion of the respondent, after reflecting over
the 20-year period since the enactment of NAFTA. Of respondents who answered item 2
(N=3,633), 13% perceived their economic mobility as easier, 73% as harder, and 14% the same. I
recoded responses to item 2 and generated a binary variable (i.e. Economic Mobility Harder)
whose values are 1 if economic mobility is perceived as harder or 0 if economic mobility is
perceived as easier (see Appendix E). This variable is used as a binary measure of perceptions of
economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. Of respondents who answered item 3
(N=3,109), 85% perceive harder, or reduced economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years ago
and 15% have perceptions of easier, or greater economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years
ago. I also recoded item 3’s responses to generate an interval variable (i.e. How Much Harder
Since NAFTA) that provided a scalar measure of how much easier or harder constituents perceived
their economic mobility using values 1 through 7 except value 4. which consists of neutral
responses and renumbered the scale from 1 to 6 (see Appendix E). I also use two additional
measures theoretically related to measuring the perception dynamics of economic mobility based
on the literature review (Athreya & Romero, 2015:169; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016:1951; Davidai
& Gilovich, 2018:300; Bertotti & Modanese, 2016).
Responses to section 127.6, item 1 (N=3,639) were recoded to generate an interval variable
(i.e. estimate of social mobility) that measures perceptions of social mobility which shares a close
theoretical association with economic mobility, and serve as a measure of how easily constituents
believe they can get ahead, based on the perceived level of opportunity available in the U.S. (see
Appendix E). 9% of voter responses were that there was a great deal of opportunity in America to
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get ahead. 17% of voters who responded perceived that there was a lot of opportunity in America
to get ahead. 40% of voters believed that there was a moderate amount of opportunity in America
to get ahead. 29% of voters believed that there was a little opportunity in America to get ahead,
and 5% perceived that there was no opportunity in America to get ahead at all. Finally, I include a
measure of how the income gap is perceived in 2016 compared to 20 years ago, as a partial measure
of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA. Lower levels of perceived economic
mobility are strongly associated with opinions that the income inequality is greater (Bertotti &
Modanese, 2016). Therefore, I expect that a measure for perceptions of the income gap in 2016
compared to 20 years ago, will corroborate with the theoretical assumptions I used to develop a
means of measuring perceptions of economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20-years prior. I
recoded the responses to section 33.7, item 1, which asks respondents if the difference they
perceive in incomes between rich and poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or
about the same as it was 20 years ago (see Appendix E). I am particularly interested in those who
perceive the income gap between rich and poor households as larger. I coded responses (N=3,683)
of the gap being larger as value 1 and smaller as value 0 to create a binary operationalization (i.e.
Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA) of income inequality theoretically associated with economic
mobility (see Appendix E).
These four operationalizations of perceived economic mobility (i.e. economic mobility
harder, how much harder since NAFTA, estimate of social mobility, and larger income gap since
NAFTA) are used in each of the 4 hypotheses being tested to satisfy the necessary rigor of testing
hypothesis 1, to measure characteristics theoretically associated with economic mobility, and to
test for a link to NAFTA based on the 20 year period comparison. Additionally, inclusion of each
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measure collectively generates greater strength in the relationship between perceptions of
economic mobility and their impact on American politics and society.
4.3 Hypothesis 2
My second hypothesis tests the marginal effects of preferring greater nationalism and
protectionism and holding populist beliefs, on the likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump
in 2016. I will now discuss each of the data used for this multiple regression analysis.
i. Hypothesis 2 Dependent Variable: Will Vote for Trump In 2016 (see Appendix D)
The dependent variable, will vote for trump in 2016, of hypothesis 2 is a measure of the
likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump6 rather than Hillary Clinton (N=2,927). The
original survey question asks who voters think they will vote for and the possible responses are
the presidential candidates Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Gary Johnson, Jill Stein, or other. I
recoded the response data to generate a variable which includes only observations for Hillary
Clinton valued as 0, and observations for Donald Trump valued as 1 (see Appendix E). Of the
survey respondents 54% identified as intending to vote for Hillary Clinton, while 46% identified
as intending to vote for Donald Trump. I coded this variable to include only observations for
Trump and Clinton because I want to test for congruence between the Trump campaign (i.e.
intending to vote for Donald Trump) and preferences for the outcomes tested in hypothesis 1 (i.e.
greater nationalism and protectionism and holding populist beliefs), as oppose to the Clinton
campaign.
4.3a Hypothesis 2 Independent Variables: Nationalism, Protectionism, Populism
The outcomes tested in hypothesis 1 (i.e. preferences for greater nationalism and
protectionism and holding populist beliefs) are also the independent variables used to measure the
30

marginal effects of congruence with the policy orientation of the Trump campaign, on the
likelihood of intending to vote for Donald Trump. Measurements and coding for each of the
independent variables for testing hypothesis 2 remained the same as they were for measurements
tested in hypothesis 1, however the interval measure of increased nationalism will be used as a
covariate rather than the binary measure. This is to provide a wider range of values to use when
testing the marginal effects of hypothesis 2.
4.4 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 is a test to establish the causal link between intent to vote for Trump as the
independent variable and holding perceptions of reduced (harder) economic mobility as the
dependent variable. 89% of respondents that showed an intent to vote for Donald Trump also
perceive economic mobility in 2016 as harder compared to 20 years ago, while 11% of Trump
voters perceive easier economic mobility in 2016 compared to 20 years ago. Therefore, I believe
that cross-analyzing the perceptions of reduced economic mobility with voter election preferences
will test the transitivity between holding perceptions of reduced economic mobility, preferring
campaign which promote populism and calling for greater nationalism and protectionism, and
voter support for Donald Trump (see Figure 15c.).
4.5. Hypothesis 4
My final hypothesis tests a possible counterargument to the transitivity among concepts
measured within hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. I contend that even if constituents hold perceptions of
reduced economic mobility, preferences for greater nationalism and protectionism, holds populist
beliefs, and holds policy preferences congruent to those of the Trump campaign, as the level of
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experienced racial discrimination increases among U.S. constituents 7, their likelihood of intending
to vote for Donald Trump decreases (i.e. Will Vote For Trump in 2016).
4.5a Hypothesis 4 Independent Variable: Level of Experienced Racial Discrimination (see
Appendix D)
I test hypothesis 4 using response data from are from section 165, item 2 (N=3,583) which
asks voters to record the level of discrimination they have personally faced because of their skin
color (e.g. light, medium, or dark). 2% of voters indicated having experienced a great deal of
discrimination, 3% indicated they had experienced a lot, 11% had received a moderate amount of
discrimination due to their skin tone, 26% indicated having experienced discrimination a little, and
58% claimed to not have experienced any discrimination of their skin tone at all.” I recoded the
response data, keeping only survey response that were value 1 through 5 and developed a scalar
variable (i.e. Racial Discrimination Exp’d) to serve as measure of the experienced discrimination
due to skin tone (see Appendix E). Given that skin tone/hue is the foundation from which race is
perceived, I think that this variable measures the concept of racial discrimination well without
focusing on a specific category of race. I want to capture the experience of discrimination due to
race/skin tone among constituents, and attempt detect if it has an overriding effect on the outcome
of the dependent variable. I include five additional control variables in this model which include
operationalizations of measures for perceptions of economic mobility2 as harder in 2016 compared
to 20 years prior, preferences for greater nationalism 3 and protectionism4, and holding populist
beliefs5 (i.e. Economic Mobility Harder, Increased Nationalism (Interval), Opposes Involvement
in FTA's, Job Loss Due to Immigration, and Holds Populist Belief).
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4.6 Control Variables (see Appendix E)
The variables I use to control for alternative explanations associated with political
preferences and outcomes tested in all of my hypotheses are total household income 10 divided into
quantiles, employment status21, highest education level11, self-identified as racial minority9,
political party orientation17, recorded age of respondent that is not the surveyor’s estimate, and
perceived gender.8 I also include the pre-election and post-election sample weights. The
socioeconomic status (SES) of voters is closely related to these demographic characteristics which
are by no means entirely balanced in distribution among voters. Therefore, by controlling for the
explanatory power of these differences among U.S. constituents I am controlling for possible
perceptions of relative deprivation perceived between them and attempting to isolate the
perception and preference dynamics within each of my statistical models.
4.7 Methods (see Appendix F)
This section consists of the details pertaining to how I conducted the statistical analysis
within my cross-sectional study to test each of my hypotheses, the structure of each statistical
model, and how I interpreted the results of my manipulations. Based on the structure of my
hypotheses, they are all one-tailed tests and statistical significance was determined using alpha
levels of 5%, 1%, and .01% for all results regardless of regression method, as well as the
corresponding confidence intervals (Pollock III, 2016:158). I controlled for heteroskedasticity in
all regression models using robust clusters based on the voter’s state within the sample (see
Appendix E) (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:391). I used logit regression analysis to test each of my

21

Section 62, item 14, reads “We’d like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you
unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what?” Response are “1. Working now, 2.
Temporarily laid off, 4. Unemployed, 5. Retired, 6. Permanently disabled, 7. Homemaker, 8. Student.” Value 3. Is
not recorded or used to indicate an employment status in the survey.
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hypotheses, except H1b2, for significant marginal effects based on the maximum likelihood
estimates (MLE) of outcomes regressed within each. I also used logit regression analysis because
its primary statistical function is to regress binary outcome variables, and binary is the coding for
each of my dependent variables, except job loss due to immigration, the dependent variable of
H1b2 (see Appendix E) (Pollock III, 2016:216-218).
The results provided from each logit regression were tested for goodness of fit using 100
groups (i.e. each regression sample is divided into 100 groups) because the differences between
the number of observations and covariate patterns is minimal. Additionally, post-estimations were
used to determine the change of predicted probabilities occurring across various intervals. To test
H1b2 for significant marginal effects I used ordinary least squares regression analysis (OLS). OLS
regression analysis allowed me to test for significant marginal effects that covariates have on the
intensity of believing that immigration levels will result in job loss (see Appendix D). The
dependent variable of H1b2 is also scalar and works best with OLS regression analysis to measure
the intensity of the respective covariates’ effect on job loss due to immigration (see Appendix E)
(Pollock III, 2016:203-208). I used the variance inflation factor to check the OLS regression results
of H1b2 for multicollinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 2009:328-330). Statistical methods for my data
analysis were completed using the Stata 15.1 statistical software.
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5. Results (see Appendix E, F, and G)
The following section consists of the statistical analysis for each regression model used in
testing my hypotheses. For each model I report statistically significant findings, related marginal
data, and how I determined either the justification or falsification of the corresponding hypothesis.
Overall, I rejected the null hypothesis for hypotheses 2., 3., and 4. However, I could not reject the
null hypothesis for hypothesis 1.
5.1. Hypothesis 1a. Model Results (see Table G1a.)
The results of testing hypothesis 1a. for statistically significant marginal effects were
moderately supportive in justifying my acceptance of the null hypothesis. As perception dynamics
associated with opinions of harder economic mobility increase among U.S. voters, the likelihood
of preferring increases in U.S. nationalism increase as well, however these results were only
marginal. Also, as estimates of social mobility increase, the likelihood of preferring greater
nationalism increases (**0.160) (see Appendix E). I believe this is the result of U.S. citizens
overestimating the level of opportunity there is to get ahead in the U.S., and although this does not
support my hypothesis it validates points made in previous studies (Davidai & Gilovich,
2018:300). The change in predicted probability from 1. None to 5. A great deal - values of the
estimate of social mobility variable, on the likelihood of U.S. voters preferring greater nationalism
was a 15.7% increase in likelihood. The change in predicted probability for one movement half of
the standard deviation was an increase or decrease of .7% between values. Additionally, among
the control variables total income (*-0.106), age (***0.027), and the gender (*-0.234) of the voter
had significant marginal effects on the likelihood of preferring greater nationalism within the
statistical model. As total income increased, the likelihood for U.S. voters to prefer an increase in
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nationalism decreased, however as the age of the voter increased, their likelihood of preferring
increases in U.S. nationalism increased as well. Also, women within this sample of voters were
5.8% less likely than men to prefer increases in U.S. nationalism. The results of the model’s
goodness-of-fit test was an 11.8% capacity to explain the variance in preferring increases in
nationalism within the model for hypothesis 1a. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 172.52 which supports
keeping some variables within this model for future tests. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic
has a p-value below .1% and indicates a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample
may apply to the U.S. voter population.
5.2. Hypothesis 1b1. Model Results (see Table G1b1.)
The results of testing hypothesis 1b1. for statistically significant marginal effects were
robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. Among U.S., the likelihood of preferring
protectionism increases significantly (*0.137), as the level of perceived hardship in economic
mobility increases. Since one of the perception dynamics used here to partially measure
perceptions of economic mobility resulted in a significant marginal effect, this supports hypothesis
1b1. (Swedberg, 2018:19). These results are congruent with some of the attitudes of voters who
perceive harder economic mobility due to foreign competition (Walley, 2017:231; Winders, 2016).
This also validates the operationalizations used here. As estimates of social mobility increased, a
preference for less protectionism was more likely (***-0.268). Here there is a possibility of having
captured relatively similar results to previous studies where voters overestimated the level of
opportunity there was to get ahead in the U.S., and although this does not support my hypothesis
it validates points made in previous studies (Davidai & Gilovich, 2018:300). The change in the
predicted probability from minimum to maximum in the intensity of perceiving harder economic
mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, increased the likelihood among voters to prefer greater
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protectionism by 13.2%, and a 4% increase or decrease based on 1 movement half the standard
deviation between values. The change in the predicted probability from minimum to maximum
categories of voter estimates of social mobility was a -22.1% decrease in the likelihood of favoring
greater protectionism. One movement half the standard deviation between values of social mobility
estimates, changes the likelihood by 5.7%.
Additionally, among the control variables total income (**0.151) yielded significant
marginal effects on the likelihood of preferring greater protectionism within the statistical model.
As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters to prefer an increase in protectionism
decreased. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a .6% capacity to explain the
variance in preferring an increase in macroeconomic protectionism within the model for
hypothesis 1b1. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 99.27 which supports keeping perhaps some of this
model’s covariates. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates
a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the U.S. voter
population.
5.3 Hypothesis 1b2. Model Results (see Table G1b2.)
The results of testing hypothesis 1b2. for statistically significant marginal effects were
robust and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. As the intensity of perceiving harder
economic mobility increased, the intensity of believing that immigration levels would result in job
losses nationally, increased significantly by 4.3% of a 1-point value (***0.043). This supports
hypothesis 1b2. since one of the perception dynamics used here to partially measure perceptions
of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, had a statistically significant effect on the
intensity the tested belief (Swedberg, 2018:19). The results are congruent with some of the
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attitudes of voters who perceived harder economic mobility due to foreign competition resulting
in job losses (Walley, 2017:231; Winders, 2016). As estimates of social mobility increased among
voters within the tested sample, the intensity in the expected likelihood of job losses decreased by
5.8% of 1 value point (*-0.058). However, voters who perceived the income gap between rich and
poor families as larger in 2016 since the enactment of NAFTA, also showed a reduced inclination
to believe job loss would occur due to immigration levels by 18.6% of a 1 value point (*-0.186).
Additionally, among the control variables total income (***-0.113) and voter age (***0.005)
yielded significant marginal effects within the statistical model. As total income increases within
the model, the inclination to expect immigration-related job loss reduces by 11.3% of 1 value point.
As voter age increased, the inclination to expect job losses due to immigration levels increased by
.5% of 1 value point. The model’s mean variance inflation factor was 1.13 and showed no signs
of issues related to multicollinearity. The F statistic showed significant model fit below .1% which
supports keeping some of this model’s covariates. The model’s R-squared statistics showed that
the covariates explain 3.7% of the change in the intensity of the tested belief.
5.4 Hypothesis 1c. Model Results (see Table G1c.)
The results of testing hypothesis 1c. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust
and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. Among U.S. voters within the sample, the
likelihood of holding a populist belief toward the government increased significantly as opinions
of reduced economic mobility intensified (**0.165) (Jensen & Bang, 2017). The change in the
predicted probability of the economic mobility perception dynamic increase by 11.5% from its
minimum to maximum value, and a 2.6% change occurs half a standard deviation from a value
point. As the estimate of social mobility (***-0.238) increases, the likelihood of U.S. voters
holding a populist belief toward the government decreases significantly. The change in the
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predicted probability of the estimate of social mobility decreases by11.5% from its minimum to
maximum value, and a 2.8% change occurs half a standard deviation from a value point. U.S.
voters within the tested sample who perceived the income gap to be larger in 2016 since the
enactment of NAFTA, were more likely to hold a populist belief towards the U.S. government
(**0.702). The change in the predicted probability of holding a populist perspective based on
perceiving the income gap to be larger increases by 10.2% from perceiving it as smaller (0) to
perceiving it as larger (1), and a 1.8% change a half of a standard deviation between the two
values. This supports hypothesis 1c. since both perception dynamics used here to partially measure
perceptions of economic mobility since the enactment of NAFTA, had a statistically significant
effect on the likelihood of U.S. voters within the sample holding populist beliefs toward the U.S.
government.
These results show that U.S. voters within the sample who perceiver greater economic
hardship since the enactment of NAFTA, are more likely to hold populist beliefs. Additionally,
among the control variables total income (**0.158) and partisan ID (*-0.132) yielded significant
marginal effects on the likelihood of holding a populist belief about U.S government interests. As
total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters to hold a populist belief toward their
government increased. U.S. voters within the sample who identified as independent rather than
Democrat or Republican were more likely to hold a populist belief about their government’s
interests (Jensen & Bang, 2017: 346). The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 52.7%
capacity to explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters holding populist beliefs within the
model for hypothesis 1c. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 83.09 which supports keeping perhaps some
of this model’s covariates with higher frequencies. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a pvalue below .1% and indicates a greater likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may
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apply to the broader U.S. voter population.
5.5 Hypothesis 2. Model Results (see Table G2.)
The results of testing hypothesis 2. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust
and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. U.S. voters with preferences congruent to the
policy positions of the Trump campaign were more likely to intend on voting for Donald Trump
rather than Hillary Clinton (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley, 2017:231).
As the intensity of favoring greater nationalism increased among U.S voters within the test sample,
their likelihood of intending on voting for Trump in 2016 increased (***0.625). The change in the
predicted probability of the likelihood for voters who favored greater nationalism to intend on
voting for Trump in 2016 from the minimum to maximum value was 41.9%. Movement half of a
standard deviation between values would result in a positive or negative change of 14.5%. U.S.
voters within the tested sample who opposed U.S. involvement in FTA’s were more likely to intend
on voting for Trump in 2016 (***0.941). The change in the predicted probability on the likelihood
of voters who oppose FTA’s to intend to vote for Trump in 2016 from the favor to oppose value
was 22.4%. Movement half of a standard deviation between the two values would result in a
positive or negative change of 10.2% on the likelihood of voters opposed to FTA’s voting for
Trump. As the belief that job losses are likely to occur due to immigration levels intensifies, the
likelihood of intending to vote for Trump in 2016 increases (***1.062). Within this model a
change in the predicted probability on the likelihood of intending to vote for trump based on the
intensity of voter perceptions about immigration-related job loss from the minimum to maximum
value is 65.9%. Movement half of a standard deviation between values of the measured results in
a positive or negative change of 24.9% on likelihood of intent to vote Trump in 2016. U.S. voters
within the model sample who held populist beliefs about U.S. government showed an increased
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likelihood of voting for Trump in 2016 (***1.575). The change in the predicted probability
between voters within the sample who identify as holding a populist belief and those who do not
is a 29.6% increase from the minimum to maximum values. Half a standard deviation between the
two values results in a positive or negative change of 13.5%.
Additionally, among the control variables total income (*0.223), voter age (**0.017), and
gender (**-0.415) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of intending on voting for
Trump in 2016. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample
to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. As voter age increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within
the tested sample to intend to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. Women were 9.6% less likely to
vote for Trump in 2016. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 36.3% capacity to
explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to intend on voting
for Trump in 2016. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 442.09 which supports keeping perhaps some of this
model’s stronger covariates. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and
indicates an increased likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the
broader U.S. voter population.
5.6 Hypothesis 3. Model Results (see Table G3.)
The significant marginal effects of testing hypothesis 3. were moderate and support my
rejection of the null hypothesis. U.S. voters who intended on voting for Donald Trump rather than
Hillary Clinton in 2016 were more likely to perceive their economic mobility as harder since the
enactment of NAFTA (*0.342). Here I used the economic mobility perception dynamic which had
the strongest relationships in hypothesis 1 overall, rather than perceptions of the income gap. No
other significant effects from covariates (i.e. the controls) resulted from the analysis. The change
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in the predicted probability of voters who intended to vote for Trump in 2016, on the likelihood of
perceiving harder economic mobility in 2016 from the easier to harder was 4.1%. Movement half
of a standard deviation between from either would result in a positive or negative change of 2.1%.
The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was a 21.7% capacity to explain the variance in the
likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample who intended on voting for Trump in 2016 to
perceive reduced economic mobility. The Wald Chi2 statistic is 32.27 which is a reason to seek
stronger covariates holding greater explanatory power. The model’s probability Chi2 statistic has
a p-value below .1% and indicates an increased likelihood that frequencies tested within the sample
may apply to an untested or broader characteristic of the 2016 Trump supporter.
5.7 Hypothesis 4. Model Results (see Table G4.)
The results of testing hypothesis 4. for statistically significant marginal effects were robust
and support my rejection of the null hypothesis. These data suggest the level of transitivity between
hypotheses 1a., 1b., and 1c is reduced after introducing the racial discrimination characteristic to
the profile tested in hypothesis 4. As the level of experienced racial/skin tone discrimination among
voters within the tested sample increased, there likelihood of intending to vote for Trump in 2016
decreased (**-0.310). The change in the predicted probability between the minimum and
maximum levels of discrimination experienced on the likelihood of U.S. voters intending to vote
for Trump in 2016 was decreased by -25%. Movement half the standard deviation from a value
results in a positive or negative change of 7.1%. Additionally, among the control variables all
preferences congruent with the policy positions of the Trump campaign in hypothesis 2, except for
perceptions of economic mobility in terms of income, which served to act as a proxy for
perceptions of economic mobility overall, had similarly significant marginal effects on the
likelihood of a Trump voter in 2016. Also, total income (*0.207), voter age (*0.013), and gender
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(***-0.619) yielded significant marginal effects on the likelihood of intending on voting for Trump
in 2016. As total income increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample to vote
for Trump in 2016 increased. As voter age increased, the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested
sample to vote for Trump in 2016 increased. Women were 14.5% less likely to vote for Trump in
2016 within this model. The results of the model’s goodness-of-fit test was an 8.9% capacity to
explain the variance in the likelihood of U.S. voters within the tested sample who have experienced
racial/skin tone discrimination to intend on voting for Trump in 2016. The Wald Chi2 statistic is
579.11 and most of this model’s covariates displayed strong statistical relationships. The model’s
probability Chi2 statistic has a p-value below .1% and indicates an increased likelihood that
frequencies tested within the sample may apply to the broader U.S. voter population.
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6. Conclusions
6.1 Discussion
Overall the results of this study were robust, and three-fourths of the theoretical framework
held. Based on my results, greater overlap between constituent preferences and the policy positions
of the Trump campaign in 2016, increased the likelihood of U.S. voters to have supported Donald
Trump (see Figure 15b and Table G2) (Swedberg, 2018:15,18,20; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Walley,
2017:231). Also, U.S. voters who supported the Trump campaign in 2016 were significantly more
likely to describe their economic mobility in 2016 since the enactment of NAFTA, as harder (see
Figure 15c and Table G3) (Walley, 2017:234; Swedberg, 2018: 20, 16). However, U.S. voters who
identified as victims of racial discrimination were less likely to support Trump in 2016 regardless
of having preferences congruent with the campaign (see Figure 15d and Table G4) (Winders,
2016:291; Sirin et al. 2016a; see also Sirin et al., 2016b, 2017). This is a voter characteristic which
overrode the best performing perception dynamic of economic mobility in this study. Although
the likelihood of U.S. voters to prefer greater economic protection from foreign competition and
hold populist beliefs increased with perceptions of economic hardship, the likelihood of preferring
greater nationalism was marginal in this study (see Figure 15f and Table G1a). The answer to my
research question22 is that among U.S. voters in 2016, those with perceptions of reduced economic
mobility since the enactment of NAFTA were more likely to have supported changes in U.S.
macroeconomic policies, to implement greater protection from elitism within the U.S. government
and foreign economic competition. Additionally, U.S. voters holding said preferences were

22

“How did U.S. perceptions of economic mobility affect voter perceptions of the U.S. economic overall, and what
are the implications therein related to individual and group preferences toward NAFTA and Trump’s candidacy,
during the 2016 U.S. elections?”
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significantly more likely to support Trump’s candidacy during the 2016 Presidential election rather
than Hillary Clinton. However, U.S. voters who were victims of racial discrimination and had
preferences congruent with the campaign agenda were less likely to support Trump’s candidacy
over Clinton’s.
I believe my study adds to the literature concerning political campaigns, the 2016 U.S.
elections, research concerned with how the perceived effects of trade policy influences voter
behavior, and how empathy may affect voter behavior in overriding ways. NAFTA has benefitted
the U.S. exponentially, yet the distribution of proceeds across U.S. society has remained uneven,
especially since wages in unskilled labor have remained plateaued since 2000 and decreasing in
2008. The conditions of a 16-year wage stagnation and increased competition among domestic
laborers, led many to favor populist leaning candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump,
however following Bernie Sanders’ concession to Hillary Clinton during the primaries, some
supporters for Sanders shifted away from Clinton, potentially creating additional support for
Trump (Kurtzleben, 2017). Donald Trump’s pledge to renegotiate FTA’s, implement immigration
reforms, and drain the swamp in Washington D.C. was what many U.S. voters wanted from a
Presidential candidate in 2016.
6.2. Limitations
I believe that a subsequent study using a better specified operationalization for nationalism
would help to retest hypothesis 1a. and investigate the implications of preferences for greater
nationalism among U.S. voters. I think the likelihood of preferring increased nationalism based on
how much harder economic mobility is perceived might increase significantly, if measured in a
way that captures a more conservative economic nationalism. The distributions of the sample data
45

used also contained super-majorities and this can result from the data gathering process. The
overrepresentation of groups within the sample may also contribute to the behaviors of certain
variables, and in turn bias these results in a way not necessarily applicable to other studies
concerning topics which use similar concepts. The control variable for racial minority voters was
not significant and this might have to do with an underrepresentation of minorities within the
survey. However, based on the census data one can infer that the underrepresentation may also be
due to low participation from U.S. voters who would add to the underrepresented groups.
This may be due to less perceived commonality between voters who identify as a racial
minority and the candidate who eventually hold offices (Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods, 2005:75).
Minority voters may be more likely to participate in surveys such as ANES, the U.S. census, and
display increased participation in elections if political outcomes were more evenly distributed
between majority and minority groups (Barreto et al., 2005:76). Additionally, my research does
not address high skilled positions in the U.S. being filled by immigrants rather than U.S. citizens,
and perhaps among U.S. citizens an additional category of high skilled positions filled between
natural born and naturalized may also yield findings of scholarly interest (Freeman & Kessler,
2008:667).
In conclusion this study’s voter-choice regression models could be improved with better
operationalizations of economic nationalism, lower overrepresentation among racial groups within
the original sample data, and additional operationalizations to test the marginal effects of job
competition among categories of higher skilled laborers.
6.3. Implications
I predict that the Trump campaign will again target voters concerned primarily with
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economic self-interests, and that competing campaigns will attempt to attract voters who identify
as victims of discrimination since the 2016 election (e.g. sexual assault, sexism, and racism) in
addition to the broader opposition to Trump’s reelection in 2020 (Keith, 2017). With the creation
of the UMCA and measures taken to address issues along the U.S.-Mexico border, the Trump
administration continues to address and seemingly fulfill its 2016 campaign agenda. As we
advance to 2020 it will be interesting to see how much momentum populist targeting campaigns
gain, considering the success of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in 2016. It will also be
interesting to see what new promises candidates will make to constituents, and of those promises
which gain traction among U.S. voters who overridingly vote according to empathy rather than
economic self-interests in 2020. If a Trump victory were to occur in 2020 I believe it would require
some level of support from Hispanic and Latino U.S. voters. As domestic unrest continues in
Venezuela the situation is a has become a political speaking point for Donald Trump leading up to
2020 and quite possibly a means of attracting Hispanic and Latino voters (Kelemen, 2019).
However, his position on immigration remains a key policy position which could be sending
Hispanic and Latino voters in the direction of other candidates (Collingwood, Barreto, & GarciaRios, 2014). Hispanics and Latino U.S. voters are among the fastest growing groups in the U.S.,
and like many other racial/ethnic groups consists of people with individual differences (Kenski &
Tisinger, 2006). Thus, it will be interesting to see how Hispanics and Latinos behave during the
2020 U.S. presidential election.
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VIII. Figures and Appendices

Figure 1.
1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. Same, N=3,633. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 127.6, Item 2.
“When it comes to people trying to improve their financial well-being, do you think it is
now easier, harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?”
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Figure 2.
N= 2,663. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 130, Item 1. “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor
nor oppose the government trying to reduce the difference in incomes between the richest and
poorest households?”

Figure 3.
1. A great deal easier, 2. A moderate amount easier, 3. A little easier, 4. A little harder, 5. A
moderate amount harder 6. A great deal harder. N=3,109. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section
127.6, Item 3. “How much easier or harder compared to 20 years ago?”
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Figure 4.
1. A great deal 2. A lot 3. A moderate amount 4. A little 5. None. N= 3,639. Section 127.6, Item
1. “How much opportunity is there in America today for the average person to get ahead?”
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Figure 5.
U.S.-Mexico Wages & Income Gap. Adapted from the LCLAA 2018, Fracaso: NAFTA’s
Disproportionate Damage to U.S. Latino and Mexico Working People.

Figure 6a.
Distributions of U.S. import and export revenue.
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Figure 6b.
Distributions of foreign direct investment (U.S., Mexico, and Canada).

Figure 7.
N= 3,621. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 137, Item 1. “Recently, some big American
companies have been hiring workers in foreign countries to replace workers in the U.S. Do you
think the federal government should discourage companies from doing this, encourage companies
to do this, or stay out of the matter?”
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Figure 8.
Unemployment Rate – Manufacturing Industry 1985 through 2009. Adapted from Thakkar, B. S.,
& Sands, S. K. (2011). Influence of NAFTA on Current US Economy. Perspectives on Global
Development and Technology, 10(1), 143-155.

Figure 9.
GDP Per Capita (PPP): U.S. vs Mexico 2000-2009. Adapted from Thakkar, B. S., & Sands, S.K.
(2011). Influence of NAFTA on Current US Economy. Perspectives on Global Development and
Technology, 10(1), 143-155.

57

Figure 10.
Influxes between U.S. corn imports to Mexico and annual immigration to the United States from
Mexico, adapted from the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (2018).

Figure 11a.
N= 3,641. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 134.7, Item 7. “During the past 12 months, has
anyone in your family or a close personal friend lost a job, or has no one in your family and no
close personal friend lost a job in the past 12 months?”
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Figure 11b.
N= 1,727. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 133, Item 1. “Some people have suggested placing
new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would
raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you Favor or Oppose new limits on imports?”

Figure 12.
1. Increased a lot, 2. Increased a little, 3. Left the same as it is now 4. Decreased a little 5. Decreased
a lot. N=3,622. Adapted from ANES 2016, Section 134, Item 1. “Do you think the number of
immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the U.S. to live should be…?”
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Figure 13.
1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 3. Somewhat likely 4. Not at all likely. N=3,630. Adapted from
ANES 2016, Section 134, Item 2. “How likely is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs
away from people already here (i.e. U.S.)?”
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Figure 14.
Percentage of Clinton & Trump Supporters Opinions about Big Problems in The U.S. Adapted
from Doherty, C. (2016). 5 Facts about Trump Supporters’ views of immigration. Pew Research
Center, Washington, D.C. (August 25) http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/08/25/5-factsabout-trump-supporters-views-of-immigration/
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Figure 15. Theoretical Frameworks of Hypotheses:

Figure 15a.

Figure 15b.
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Figure 15c.

Figure 15d.
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Figure 15e.

Figure 15f.
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Appendix A.
Overview of ANES 2016 sample data:
General Socioeconomic Characteristics.
N= 4,272
Variables = 1,196
Perception of Gender:
Women
Men
Total
Perception of Race:
White, alone
Hispanic
Black, alone
Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific, alone
Indigenous American, alone
Multi. Ethnic
Total
Income:
5-22.49K
22.5-49.9K
50K- 89.9K
90K-250+K
Total
Highest Level of Education:
Grade 1st to 12th (No Diploma)
High School Diploma/GED or Some College
Associate Degree (Occupational or
Vocational)
Bachelor's Degree (e.g. BA, BS, etc.)
Graduate Degree (e.g. MA, MS, Ph.D., JD.)
Total
Perceptions of Social Class:
Lower
Middle
Working
Upper
Total
Labor Characteristics:
Employed
Unemployed
Total
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N
2,332
1,987
4,319
N
3,038
450
398
148
27
177
4,238
N
581
952
1,096
1,164
3,793
N
282
1,709

Percent
54%
46%
100%
Percent
72%
11%
9%
3%
1%
4%
100%
Percent
15%
25%
29%
31%
100%
Percent
7%
40%

601
955
680
4,227
N
277
872
1,369
119
2,637
N
2, 596
1,659
4255

14%
23%
16%
100%
Percent
11%
33%
52%
5%
100%
Percent
61%
39%
100%

Size of Household Other than Self:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total
Living Arrangement:
Rent
Mortgage
Own no payments due
Other arrangement
Total
Have Health Insurance:
Insured
Uninsured
Total
Party Orientation
Democrat
Republican
Independent
Total
Age Groups
18 to 34
35 to 50
51 to 69
70 to 90 or older
Total

66

N
1,287
764
568
328
145
38
16
9
1
0
1
2
3,159
N
1,286
1,754
886
308
4,234
N
3,891
374
4,265
N
1,451
1,231
1,367
4,049
N
1,039
1,053
1,491
567
4,150

Percent
40.74%
24.18%
17.98%
10.38%
4.59%
1.20%
0.51%
0.28%
0.03%
0.00%
0.03%
0.06%
100.00%
Percent
30%
41%
21%
7%
100%
Percent
91%
9%
100%
Percent
36%
30%
34%
100%
Percent
25%
25%
36%
14%
100%

Appendix B.

Parallel U.S. Population Estimates Adapted
From The U.S. Census Bureau V2018 Data
N = 327,167,434
Sex Across U.S.
Percent
Female
50.8%
Male
49.2%
Race and Hispanic Origin Across U.S.
White, alone
76.6%
Black, alone
13.4%
Asian, Hawaiian, Pacific, alone
6%
Indigenous American, alone
1.3%
Multi. Ethnic
2.7%
Education Across U.S.
High School Grad. or Higher 25+ Yrs. Old 87.3%
Bachelor's Degree or Higher 25+ Yrs. Old
30.9%
Miscellaneous:
Non-U.S. Citizen or Natural Born
13.4%
Persons in Civilian Labor Force
63.0%
Median Household Income (2017 USD) $57,652
Ratio of Persons Per Household
2.63
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Appendix C.

Overview of ANES 2016 Hispanic, Latino, and Immigrant
Data Characteristics:
Naturalized or Natural Born Citizen
N Percent
Natural Born
3828
90%
Naturalized
415
10
Total
4243
100%
Language at Home Spanish/English:
N Percent
Only English
122
27%
Mostly English
91
20%
Both Equally
149
33%
Mostly Spanish
65
15%
Only Spanish
22
5%
Total
449
100%
News in Spanish or English:
N Percent
English More
298
80%
Spanish More
61
16%
Both Equally
14
4%
Total
373
100%
How Much Use of English and Spanish
N Percent
English and little or no Spanish
115
31%
Mostly English but Spanish at least
108
29%
Both English but Spanish at least
107
29%
Mostly Spanish but English at least
31
8%
Spanish and little or no English
12
3%
Total
373
100%
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Appendix D.
Overview of ANES 2016 Distributions By
Non-Control Variables After Coding For Analysis:
Increased Nationalism (Binary)
N
1. Agree
1,105
0. Disagree
1,267
Total
2,372
Increased Nationalism (Interval)
N
1. Disagree Strongly
570
2. Disagree Somewhat
697
3. Agree Somewhat
797
4. Agree Strongly
308
Total
2,372
Opposes Involvement in FTA's
N
1. Oppose
726
0. Favor
1,421
Total
2,147
Job Loss Due to Immigration
N
1. Not Likely at All
866
2. Somewhat Likely
1,474
3. Very Likely
737
4. Extremely Likely
553
Total
3,630
Holds Populist Belief
N
1. Government Run by Few
3,498
0. Government Run For All
716
Total
4,214
Will Vote for Trump In 2016
N
1. Trump
1,357
0. Clinton
1,570
Total
2,927
Economic Mobility Harder
N
1. Harder
2,645
0. Easier
466
Total
3,111
How Much Harder Since
NAFTA
N
1. A great Deal Easier
95
2. A Moderate Amount Easier
253
3. A Little Easier
118
69

Percent
47%
53%
100%
Percent
24%
29%
34%
13%
100%
Percent
34%
66%
100%
Percent
24%
41%
20%
15%
100%
Percent
83%
17%
100%
Percent
46%
54%
100%
Percent
85%
15%
100%
Percent
3%
8%
4%

4. A Little Harder
5. A Moderate Amount Harder
6. A Great Deal Harder
Total
Estimate of Social Mobility
0. None
1. A Little
2. A Moderate Amount
3. A Lot
4. A Great Deal
Total

226
1,140
1,277
3109
N
177
1,059
1,448
608
347
3639

Larger Income Gap Since
NAFTA
N
1. Larger
3,462
0. Smaller
221
Total
3,683
Racial Discrimination Exp'd.
N
0. None
2,077
1. A Little
924
2. A Moderate Amount
384
3. A Lot
107
4. A Great Deal
91
Total
3,583
Distribution of Economic Mobility Harder 20Yrs.
Across Trump Voters:
N
Harder
878
Easer
112
Total Trump Voters
990
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7%
37%
41%
100%
Percent
5%
29%
40%
17%
9%
100%
Percent
94%
6%
100%
Percent
58%
26%
11%
3%
2%
100%
Percent
89%
11%
100%

Appendix E.
Variable Index:
Nationalism. (Increased Nationalism, Binary)
Original Name: V162123
Original Label: Better if rest of world more like America
Question: Section 127.2, Item 1, “The world would be a better place if people from other countries
were more like Americans. Do you agree… with this statement?”
Responses: 1. Agree strongly, 2. Agree somewhat, 3. Neither agree or disagree, 4. Disagree
somewhat, 5. Disagree strongly
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Agree, 0. Disagree. (1/2= “1”, option 3 removed, 4/5= “0”.)
Scalar Coding: 4. Agree strongly, 3. Agree somewhat, 2. Disagree somewhat, 1. Disagree strongly.
(option 3 removed)
Protectionism. (Opposes Involvement in FTA's)
Original Name: V162176
Original Label: Does R favor or oppose free trade agreements w/other countries
Question: Section 136.8, Item 2, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S
making free trade agreements with other countries?”
Responses: 1. Favor, 2. Oppose, 3. Neither favor nor oppose
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Oppose, 0. Favor. (option 3 removed)

Protectionism. (Job Loss Due to Immigration)
Original Name: V162158
Original Label: How likely immigration will take away jobs
Question: Section 134, Item 2, “How like is it that recent immigration levels will take jobs away
from people already here?”
Responses: 1. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 3. Somewhat likely, 4. Not at all likely
Coding for Analysis:
Scalar Coding: 3. Extremely likely, 2. Very likely, 1. Somewhat likely, 0. Not at all likely.
Populist Belief. (Holds Populist Belief)
Original Name: V161216
Original Label: Govt run by a few big interests or for benefit of all
Question: Section 48.6, Item 4, “Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big
interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?”
Responses: 1. Run by a few big interests, 2. For the benefit of all the people
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Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Run by a few big interests, 0. For the benefit of all the people
Intent to Vote for Trump. (Will Vote for Trump In 2016)
Original Name: V161031
Original Label: For whom does R intend to vote for President
Question: Section 21.1, Item 16, “Who do you think you will vote for?”
Responses: 1. Hillary Clinton, 2. Donald Trump, 3. Gary Johnson, 4. Jill Stein, 5. Other
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Donald Trump, 0. Hillary Clinton. (options 3/5 removed)
Perception of Reduced Economic Mobility in 2016 Compared to 20 Years Ago. (Economic
Mobility Harder)
Original Name: V162135
Original Label: Economic mobility compared to 20 years ago
Question: Section 127.6, Item 2, “When it comes to people trying to improve their financial wellbeing, do you think it is now easier, harder, or the same as it was 20 years ago?”
Responses: 1. Easier, 2. Harder, 3. The same
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Harder, 0. Easier. (option 3 removed)

Perception of Economic Mobility Interval. (How Much Harder Since NAFTA)
Original Name: V162136X
Original Label: Summary – Economic mobility easier/harder compared to 20 years ago
Question: Section 127.6, Item 3, “How much easier/harder is economic mobility compared to 20
years ago?”
Responses: 1. A great deal, 2. A moderate amount, 3. A little
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 1. A great deal easier, 2. A moderate amount easier, 3. A little easier, 4. A little
harder, 5. A moderate amount harder, 6. A great deal harder
Perception of Social Mobility. (Estimate of Social Mobility)
Original Name: V162134
Original Label: How much opportunity in American to get ahead
Question: Section 127.6, Item 1, “How much opportunity is there in America for the average
person to get ahead ?”
Responses: 1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5. None
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Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 4. A great deal, 3. A lot, 2. A moderate amount, 1. A little, 0. None
Perception of Income Gap. (Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA)
Original Name: V161137
Original Label: Income gap today more or less than 20 years ago
Question: Section 33.7, Item 1, “Do you think the differences in incomes between rich people and
poor people in the United States today is larger, smaller, or about the same as it was 20 years ago?”
Responses: 1. Larger, 2. Smaller, 3. About the same
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Larger, 0. Smaller. (option 3 removed)
Experiences of Discrimination Due to Skin Tone. (Racial Discrimination Exp’d)
Original Name: V162369
Original Label: Discrimination due to skin tone
Question: Section 165, Item 2, “How much discrimination have you personally faced because of
your skin color (e.g. light, medium, or dark)?”
Responses: 1. A great deal, 2. A lot, 3. A moderate amount, 4. A little, 5. None at all
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 0. None at all, 1. A little, 2. A moderate amount, 3. A lot, 4. A great deal
Employment Status. (Employed)
Original Name: V161277
Original Label: Initial R employment status, start of occupation module
Question: Section 62, Item 14, “We’d like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off,
or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what?”
Responses: 1. Working now, 2. Temporarily laid off, 4. Unemployed, 5. Retired, 6. Permanently
disabled, 7. Homemaker, 8. Student
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Working now, 0. All other classifications. (2/8 = “0”)
Total Income. (Total Income by Quantiles)
Original Name: V162309X
Original Label: Summary- Total income
Question: Section 63.3, Item 1, “What is the total income in 2015 of all your family members
living here/ your total income in 2015?”
Responses: Numeric hard range 0-99999999 (1 to 28 ranges)
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 1. 0-22.49k, 2. 22.5k – 49.99k, 3. 50k – 89.99k, 4. 90k – 250k or more. (1/7= “1”,
8/14= “2”, 15/21= “3”, 22/28= “4”)
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Highest Education Level. (Education)
Original Name: V161270
Original Label: Highest level of education
Question: Section 62, Item 7.1, “What is the highest level of school you have completed or the
highest degree you have received?”
Responses: 1. Less than 1st grade, 2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade, 3. 5th or 6th grade, 4. 7th or 8th grade,
5. 9th grade, 6. 10th grade, 7. 11th grade, 8. 12th grade no diploma, 9. High school graduate or
equivalent, 10. Some college but no degree, 11. Associate degree in college –
Occupational/Vocational, 12. Associate degree in college – Academic program, 13. Bachelor’s
degree (e.g. BA, BS), 14. Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS), 15. Professional School Degree (e.g.
MD, LD), 16. Doctorate degree (e.g. Ph.D., Ed.D.), 95. Other
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 1. 12th grade no diploma or less, 2. High school graduate and/or some college, 3.
Occupational/Vocational/Academic Associates, 4. Bachelor’s degree, 5. Master’s, Doctorate, or
Professional Degree. (1/8= “1”, 9/10= “2”, 11/12= “3”, 13= “4”, 14/16= “5”, option 95 removed)
Self-Identified Race. (ID as Racial Minority)
Original Name: V161310X
Original Label: R Self-identified race
Question: Section 62, Item 52.5, “Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to
be.”
Responses: 1. White, 2. Black or African-American, 3. American Indian or Alaska Native, 4.
Asian, 5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, (Hispanic treated as own category in
distribution).
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Non-white, 0. White. (2/5= “1”, 1= “0”)
Party Orientation. (Voter Partisan ID)
Original Name: V161155
Original Label: Does R think of self as Dem, Rep, Ind, or what
Question: Section 39, Item 1, “Generally Speaking do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a
Republican, an independent, or what?”
Responses: 0. No preference, 1. Democrat, 2. Republican, 3. Independent, 5. Other
Coding for Analysis:
Interval Coding: 3. Republican, 2. Independent, 1. Democrat. (option 5 removed)
Years of Age. ( Respondent Age)
Original Name:V161267
Original Label: Respondent age
Coding for Analysis:
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Interval Coding: Numeric hard range 18 to 90 or older.
Self-Identified Gender. (Gender ID)
Original Name: V161342
Original Label: R Self-identified gender
Question: Section 63.1, Item 1.5, “What is your gender”
Responses: 1. Male, 2. Female, 3. Other
Coding for Analysis:
Binary Coding: 1. Male, 2. Female. (option 3 removed)
Post-Election Sample Weight – (PstWght_Full)
Original Name: V160102
Original Label: Post-election weight – full sample
Pre-Election Sample Weight – (PreWght_Full)
Original Name: V160101
Original Label: Pre-election weight – full sample

Cluster – (State Location of Voter)
Original Name: V163001A
Original Label: Sample: Sample location FIPS State
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Appendix F.
Regression Formulas:
H1a.
Ln [Increased Nationalism (Binary)/1- Increased Nationalism (Binary)] = β0 + β1 How Much
Harder Since NAFTA + β2 Estimate of Social Mobility + β3 Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA +
Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender
ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
H1b1.
Ln [Opposes Involvement in FTA's/1- Opposes Involvement in FTA's] = β0 + β1 How Much
Harder Since NAFTA + β2 Estimate of Social Mobility + β3 Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA +
Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender
ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
H1b2.
Y(Job Loss Due to Immigration) = β0 + β1 How Much Harder Since NAFTA + β2 Estimate of
Social Mobility + β3 Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA + Controls (Employed, Total Income by
Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Postelection weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
H1c.
Ln [Holds Populist Belief/1- Holds Populist Belief] = β0 + β1 How Much Harder Since NAFTA
+ β2 Estimate of Social Mobility + β3 Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA + Controls (Employed,
Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election
weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
H2.
Ln [Will Vote for Trump In 2016/1- Will Vote for Trump In 2016] = β0 + β1 Increased
Nationalism (Interval) + β2 Opposes Involvement in FTA's + β3 Job Loss Due to Immigration +β4
Holds Populist Belief + Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority,
Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster
(State Location of Voter)

H3.
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Ln [Economic Mobility Harder/1- Economic Mobility Harder] = β0 + β1 Will Vote for Trump In
2016 + Controls (Employed, Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter,
Gender ID, Pre-election weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
H4.
Ln [Will Vote for Trump In 2016/1- Will Vote for Trump In 2016] = β0 + β1 Racial
Discrimination Exp'd. + Controls ( Economic Mobility Harder, Increased Nationalism (Interval),
Opposes Involvement in FTA's, Job Loss Due to Immigration, Holds Populist Belief, Employed,
Total Income by Quantiles, Education, Minority, Party, Age of Voter, Gender ID, Pre-election
weight, & Post-election weight), Robust Cluster (State Location of Voter)
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Appendix G.
Regression Results:

Table G1a. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of Prefering
Increased Nationalism Among U.S. Voters In 2016 Based On Perceptions of
Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 1,460
Hypothesis 1a.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
How Much Harder Since NAFTA
0.020
0.53
0.025
0.007
Estimate of Social Mobility **
0.160
2.68
0.157
0.040
Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA
-0.358
-1.4
-0.089
-0.019
Employed/Working
0.026
0.27
0.007
0.003
Total Income by Quantiles*
-0.106
-1.85
-0.078
-0.027
Education
-0.037
-0.76
-0.037
-0.011
ID as Racial Minority
0.062
0.67
0.015
0.007
Voter Partisan ID
0.009
0.11
0.004
0.002
Age of Voter***
0.027
8.29
0.453
0.118
Gender ID*
-0.234
-1.69
-0.058
-0.029
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.103
1.21
Post-election Full Sample Weight
0.323
5.42
Constant
-1.338
-2.42
Log Pseudolikelihood = -951.63487
Wald Chi2 = 172.52
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.1179
Pseudo R2 = 0.0520
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G1b1. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S.
Voters Opposing U.S.Involvement in FTA's in 2016 Based On Perceptions of
Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 1,340
Hypothesis 1b1.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
How Much Harder Since NAFTA**
0.137
2.54
0.132
0.040
Estimate of Social Mobility***
-0.268
-4.87
-0.221
-0.057
Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA
-0.307
-1.15
-0.068
-0.015
Employed/Working
-0.166
-1.01
-0.035
-0.017
Total Income by Quantiles**
-0.151
-2.34
-0.096
-0.034
Education
0.057
1.03
0.048
0.015
ID as Racial Minority
-0.047
-0.36
-0.010
-0.005
Voter Partisan ID
0.041
0.46
0.017
0.007
Age of Voter
-0.005
-1.44
-0.069
-0.017
Gender ID
0.095
0.67
0.020
0.010
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.032
0.32
Post-election Full Sample Weight
0.131
1.59
Constant
-0.504
-0.94
Log Pseudolikelihood = -797.06317
Wald Chi2 = 99.27
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.0060
Pseudo R2 = 0.0379
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G1b2. Marginal Effects of OLS Regression Analysis on Opinions Among U.S.
Voters In 2016 on The Likelihood of Domestic Job Loss Due to Immigration Based
on Perceptions of Economic Mobility Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 2,227
Hypothesis 1b2.
Independent Variables
Coefficient T-Ratio
VIF
How Much Harder Since NAFTA***
0.043
3.24
1.3
Estimate of Social Mobility*
-0.058
-2.06
1.3
Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA*
-0.186
-1.81
1.22
Employed/Working
0.002
0.04
1.18
Total Income by Quantiles***
-0.113
-5.69
1.1
Education
-0.013
-0.89
1.1
ID as Racial Minority
-0.010
-0.27
1.1
Voter Partisan ID
0.002
0.06
1.09
Age of Voter***
0.005
3.9
1.09
Gender ID
0.034
0.89
1.05
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.018
0.67
1.02
Post-election Full Sample Weight
0.089
2.94
1.02
Constant
1.255
5.8
F= ***
R2 = 0.0377
Mean VIF = 1.13
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G1c. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S.
Voters Holding Populist Beliefs In 2016 Based on Perceptions of Economic Mobility
Since The Enactment of NAFTA. N= 2,218
Hypothesis 1c.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
How Much Harder Since NAFTA**
0.165
2.99
0.115
0.026
Estimate of Social Mobility***
-0.238
-3.76
-0.115
-0.028
Larger Income Gap Since NAFTA**
0.702
2.87
0.102
0.018
Employed/Working
0.092
0.65
0.011
0.005
Total Income by Quantiles**
0.158
2.64
0.057
0.019
Education
-0.029
-0.51
-0.013
-0.004
ID as Racial Minority
-0.013
-0.09
-0.002
-0.001
Voter Partisan ID*
-0.132
-1.98
-0.031
-0.013
Age of Voter
0.005
1.07
0.038
0.009
Gender ID
-0.177
-1.25
-0.021
-0.010
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.137
1.17
Post-election Full Sample Weight
0.055
0.76
Constant
0.530
0.7
Log Pseudolikelihood = -884.19313
Wald Chi2 = 83.09
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.5273
Pseudo R2 = 0.0395
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G2. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood That U.S Voters
Would Vote for Trump In 2016 Based on Their Congruence With Trump Campaign
Policy Positions. N= 897
Hypothesis 2.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
Increased Nationalism (Interval)***
0.625
6.58
0.419
0.145
Opposes Involvement in FTA's ***
0.941
5.99
0.224
0.102
Job Loss Due to Immigration ***
1.062
10.16
0.659
0.249
Holds Populist Belief ***
1.575
4.94
0.296
0.135
Total Income by Quantiles*
0.223
2.16
0.151
0.054
Employed/Working*
0.443
1.89
0.102
0.050
Education
0.073
0.82
0.068
0.021
ID as Racial Minority
-0.032
-0.14
-0.008
-0.003
Voter Partisan ID
0.073
0.54
0.034
0.014
Age of Voter**
0.017
2.62
0.288
0.070
Gender ID**
-0.415
-2.98
-0.096
-0.048
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.032
0.27
Post-election Full Sample Weight
-0.212
-1.2
Constant
-6.257
-7.41
Log Pseudolikelihood = -406.05358
Wald Chi2 = 442.09
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.3630
Pseudo R2 = 0.3329
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G3. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S.
Voters Perceiving Economic Mobility Harder In 2016 Compared to 20 Years Ago If
Intending To Vote For Trump in 2016. N= 1,783
Hypothesis 3.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
Will Vote for Trump In 2016*
0.342
2.02
0.041
0.021
Total Income by Quantiles
0.019
0.26
0.007
0.002
Employed/Working
0.064
0.4
0.008
0.004
Education*
-0.103
-1.81
-0.050
-0.015
ID as Racial Minority
0.039
0.26
0.005
0.002
Voter Partisan ID
0.103
1.2
0.025
0.010
Age of Voter
0.007
1.46
0.059
0.014
Gender ID
-0.050
-0.42
-0.006
-0.003
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.067
0.61
Post-election Full Sample Weight
-0.028
-0.21
Constant
1.347
2.28
Log Pseudolikelihood = -725.0527
Wald Chi2 = 32.27
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.2171
Pseudo R2 = 0.0116
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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Table G4. Marginal Effects of Logit Regression Analysis on The Likelihood of U.S. Voters
Intending To Vote For Tump In 2016 Who Have Experienced Racial/Skin Tone
Discrimination. N= 757
Hypothesis 4.
Independent Variables
Coefficient Z-Ratio PR Min to Max PR SD/2
Racial Discrimination Exp'd.**
-0.310
-2.51
-0.250
-0.071
Economic Mobility Harder
-0.016
-0.06
-0.004
-0.001
Increased Nationalism (Interval)***
0.618
6.27
0.418
0.146
Opposes Involvement in FTA's***
1.016
6.46
0.243
0.111
Job Loss Due to Immigration***
1.067
10.27
0.662
0.257
Holds Populist Belief***
1.438
4.45
0.280
0.122
Total Income by Quantiles*
0.207
1.7
0.143
0.051
Employed/Working
0.351
1.36
0.082
0.040
Education
0.066
0.67
0.062
0.019
ID as Racial Minority
0.033
0.13
0.008
0.004
Voter Partisan ID
0.092
0.6
0.044
0.018
Age of Voter*
0.013
1.85
0.224
0.054
Gender ID***
-0.619
-4.22
-0.145
-0.073
Pre-election Full Sample Weight
0.088
0.73
Post-election Full Sample Weight
-0.167
-0.85
Constant
-5.448
-6.01
Log Pseudolikelihood = -341.67091
Wald Chi2 = 579.11
Prob > Chi2 = ***
Goodness-of-fit Test = 0.0893
Pseudo R2 = 0.3374
Note: Alpha levels (*5%, **1%, ***.1%) are based on analysis for a
one-tailed test using robust standard errors.
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